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ABSTRACT
Our paper examines whether the well-documented failure of unsophisticated investors to rebalance
their portfolios can help to explain the enormous counter-cyclical volatility of aggregate risk compensation
in financial markets. To answer this question, we set up a model in which CRRA-utility investors have
heterogeneous trading technologies. In our model, a large mass of investors do not re-balance their
portfolio shares in response to aggregate shocks, while a smaller mass of active investors adjust their
portfolio each period to respond to changes in the investment opportunity set. We find that these intermittent
re-balancers more than double the effect of aggregate shocks on the time variation in risk premia by
forcing active traders to sell more shares in good times and buy more shares in bad times.
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One of the largest challenges for standard dynamic asset pricing models is to explain the large
counter-cyclical variation in the risk-return trade-oﬀ in asset markets. Lettau and Ludvigson
(2010) measure the time-variation in the Sharpe ratio on equities in the data. This time variation
is driven by variation in the conditional mean of returns (the predictability of returns) as well the
variation in the conditional volatility of stock returns. In the data, these two objects are negatively
correlated, according to Lettau and Ludvigson (2010), and this gives rise to a considerable amount
of variation in the conditional Sharpe ratio: the annual standard deviation of the estimated Sharpe
ratio is on the order of 50% per annum.
In fact, in standard asset pricing models, the price of aggregate risk is constant (see, e.g., the
Capital Asset Pricing Model of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965)) or approximately constant (see,
e.g., Mehra and Prescott (1985)’s calibration of the Consumption-CAPM).1 The main explanations
in the literature for the large variation in the pricing of risk rely on counter-cyclical risk aversion
and heteroscedasticity in aggregate consumption growth. In this paper we propose an additional
mechanism which has strong empirical support in micro data and can quantitatively account for a
substantial portion of the cyclical variation in risk pricing.
In our mechanism, infrequent re-balancing on the part of passive investors contributes to coun-
tercylical volatility in risk prices. When the economy is aﬀected by an adverse aggregate shock
and the price of equity declines as a result, passive investors who re-balance end up buying eq-
uities to keep their portfolio shares constant, while intermittent rebalancers do not and thus end
up with a smaller equity share in their portfolio. Hence, in the latter case, more aggregate risk
is concentrated among the smaller pool of active investors whenever the economy is aﬀected by a
negative aggregate shock. As a result, the quantity of aggregate risk being absorbed by these active
traders is counter-cyclical. Since these active traders are actively choosing the composition of their
portfolio each period, they need to be induced to absorb this aggregate risk by counter-cyclical
1Recently, Campbell and Cochrane (1999) and Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001), among others, have shown
that standard representative agent models with diﬀerent, non-standard preferences can rationalize counter-cyclical
variation in Sharpe ratios.
2ﬂuctuations in the equilibrium price of aggregate risk.
There is strong empirical evidence in favor of the underlying micro-behavior posited in our
model. There is a large group of households that invest in equities but only change their portfolio
shares infrequently, even after large common shocks to asset returns (see, e.g., Ameriks and Zeldes
(2004), Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini (2009) and Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008)). Without a
speciﬁc model in mind, it is hard to know what eﬀect, if any, intermittent re-balancing would
have on equilibrium asset prices. In an equilibrium where all households are equally exposed
to aggregate shocks, there is no need for any single household to re-balance his or her portfolio
in response to an aggregate shock. In the absence of net repurchases and issuance, the average
investor simply consumes the dividends in each period. However, in U.S. data, more than 4/5 of
the cyclical variation in U.S. equity payouts comes from net repurchases and issuance, not from
cash dividends. The failure of intermittent rebalancers to counteract the cyclical eﬀect of equity
payouts imputes substantial pro-cyclical variation to their equity portfolio shares that needs to be
oﬀset by the equity trades of active investors. This turns out to be suﬃcient to jump-start our
mechanism.
To check the validity of our conjecture, we set up a standard incomplete markets model in
which investors are subject to idiosyncratic and aggregate risk. The investors have heterogeneous
trading technologies; a large mass of households are non-Mertonian investors who do not change
their portfolio in response to changes in the investment opportunity set, but a smaller mass of
active or Mertonian investors do. We consider two types of non-Mertonian investors: those that
re-balance their portfolio each period to keep their portfolio shares constant, and those that re-
balance intermittently. We assume that intermittent rebalancers reinvest the equity payouts in
non-rebalancing periods (see e.g. Duﬃe and Sun (1990)).
The heterogeneity in trading technologies allows us to generate substantial volatility in the
risk premiums. In the benchmark economy, we ﬁnd that the volatility of the price of aggregate
risk is 2.3 times higher in the economy with intermittent rebalancers than in the economy with
continuously re-balancing non-Mertonian investors. While the individual welfare loss associated
3with intermittent rebalancing is small relative to continuous rebalancing, and hence small costs
would suﬃce to explain this behavior, the aggregate eﬀects of non-rebalancing are large. That
makes this friction a compelling one to study.
The key ingredients are (i) a small supply of Mertonian or fast-moving capital relative to
the large supply of non-Mertonian or slow-moving capital in securities markets, (ii) non-state-
contingent intermittent rebalancing by passive investors and (iii) constant corporate leverage.
Relaxing these assumptions would dampen the ampliﬁcation of risk price volatility. The small
supply of Mertonian capital is plausible given institutional constraints on leverage faced by mutual
funds and pension funds, while hedge funds with access to leverage tend to have short investment
horizons because of the threat of redemptions. Time-dependent rules can be rationalized by intro-
ducing observation and monitoring costs into the analysis (see Duﬃe and Sun (1990), Gabaix and
Laibson (2002), Abel, Eberly, and Panageas (2006) and Alvarez, Guiso, and Lippi (2011)). The
micro and macro evidence on investor behavior seems hard to reconcile with the state-contingent
rebalancing rules that are implied by ﬁxed costs (see, e.g., Alvarez, Guiso, and Lippi (2011) for
recent evidence). Finally, we assume that corporations adjust their balance sheet faster in response
to aggregate shocks than most households, and we provide some empirical evidence to support this
assumption.
We rely on two additional frictions to match the average risk-free rate and the average risk
premium: (i) incomplete markets with respect to the idiosyncratic labor income risk and (ii) lim-
ited participation. The ﬁrst friction produces reasonable risk-free rate implications in a growing
economy. The second friction, limited participation, combined with the non-Mertonian trading
technology of some market participants, produces a high average equity premium by concentrating
aggregate risk, as in Chien, Cole, and Lustig (2011), but they only consider continuously rebalanc-
ing non-Mertonian investors. Our paper introduces intermittent rebalancers and shows that these
traders increase the volatility of risk premia.
We then use our model as a laboratory for exploring the eﬀects of changes in the composition
of the capital supply in ﬁnancial markets. In our model, increased participation by non-Mertonian
4investors, i.e., an increase in the supply of slow-moving capital, decreases the average equity pre-
mium, but substantially increases its volatility. This seems consistent with the U.S. boom-bust
experience during the 20’s, characterized by increased stock market participation and a large in-
crease in stock market volatility that lasted well into the 30’s. A similar pattern repeated itself in
the 90’s. Hence, our mechanism can help to understand secular changes in the volatility of stock
returns that are largely disconnected from the underlying volatility of macroeconomic shocks.
In the literature, counter-cyclical risk aversion, typically generated by habit persistence, is a
standard explanation for the volatility of risk pricing. Habit formation preferences can help match
the counter-cyclicality of risk premia in the data (Constantinides (1990), Campbell and Cochrane
(1999)), as well as other features of the joint distribution of asset returns and macro-economic
outcomes over the business cycle (see Jermann (1998), Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001)). A
key prediction of these preferences is that the household’s risk aversion, and hence their allocation
to risky assets, varies with wealth. According to Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008), there is little
evidence of this in the data.
How close can existing DAPM’s get to the 50% number put forward by Lettau and Ludvigson
(2010)? An annual calibration of the Campbell and Cochrane (1999) external habit model with
large variation in the investor’s risk aversion produces a volatility of 21%. The version of our model
with the same i.i.d. aggregate consumption growth shocks and constant relative risk aversion
investors (CRAA coeﬃcient is ﬁve) delivers 14%, and it reproduces the counter-cyclical variation
in the Sharpe ratio partly through negative correlation in the conditional mean and volatility of
returns. A version of the model with predictability in aggregate consumption growth delivers 25%,
an ampliﬁcation by a factor of three compared to the economy with continuous rebalancers.
In our simple model, our mechanism cannot completely close the gap with the data, in part
because it only delivers short-lived cyclical variation in risk prices and hence can only match the
cyclical volatility in the dividend yield, not the low-frequency variation. However, in a richer model,
our mechanism will augment other sources of cyclical return volatility because these in turn induce
greater ﬂuctuations in the portfolio composition of the intermittent rebalancers.2
2Other channels for time-variation in risk premia that have been explored in the literature include diﬀerences
5Finally, there is a large literature on infrequent consumption adjustment starting with Grossman
and Laroque (1990)’s analysis of durable consumption in a representative agent setting . Reis (2006)
adopts a rational inattention approach to rationalize this type of behavior. In work closely related
to ours, Lynch (1996) explores the aggregate eﬀects of infrequent consumption adjustment on the
equity premium. Lynch (1996)’s model matches the low volatility of aggregate consumption and the
low empirical correlation of market returns with aggregate consumption changes. In more recent
work, Gabaix and Laibson (2002) extend this analysis to a tractable continuous-time setup that
allows for closed-form solutions, and they also characterize the optimal inattention period.3 Our
paper explores the aggregate eﬀect of infrequent portfolio adjustment on the volatility of the equity
premium. In our approach, the intermittent rebalancers choose an intertemporal consumption path
to satisfy the Euler equation in each period, including non-rebalancing periods, but, in between
exogenous rebalancing times, their savings decisions can only aﬀect their holdings of the risk-free
assets, not their equity holdings.4
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the counter-cyclical variation in the
dividend yields, equity payouts and corporate leverage. In section 3, we review the micro and macro
evidence in support of the frictions that drive our results. Section 4 describes the environment
and the trading technologies. Section 5 discusses the calibration of the model. Section 6 shows the
results for a simple version of the economy with only two trading technologies. Section 7 looks at
the benchmark economy with three diﬀerent trading technologies. Finally, section 8 describes an
extension of the baseline model with more price volatility that produces more ampliﬁcation.
in risk aversion (Chan and Kogan (2002), Gomes and Michaelides (2008)), diﬀerences in exposure to nontradeable
risk (Garleanu and Panageas (2007)), participation constraints (Saito (1996), Basak and Cuoco (1998), Guvenen
(2009)), diﬀerences in beliefs (Detemple and Murthy (1997)) and diﬀerences in information (Schneider, Hatchondo,
and Krusell (2005)). Our paper imposes temporary participation constraints on the intermittent rebalancers instead
of permanent ones, and it explores heterogeneity in trading technologies instead of heterogeneity in preferences.
3Duﬃe (2010) provides an overview of this literature in his 2010 AFA presidential address on slow-moving capital.
4In two related papers, Alvarez, Atkeson and Kehoe (2002, 2009) analyze the equilibrium eﬀects of infrequent
bond and money trading on interest rates and exchanges rate in a Baumol-Tobin model; a ﬁxed cost is incurred
when transferring money between the brokerage and the checking accounts.
62 Cyclical Variation
Our mechanism operates at business cycle frequencies. As a result, we need to understand the
cyclical behavior of dividend yields, equity payouts and leverage. To do so, we run these series
through a standard bandpass ﬁlter. This allows us to focus on the variation at business cycle
frequencies between 1.5 and 8 years. In this section, we document three stylized facts that will
guide and motivate our analysis: (i) the price of risk in stock markets is highly counter-cyclical,
which renders dividend yields counter-cyclical (ii) leverage in the corporate sector is counter-cyclical
but much less so than dividend yields (iii) equity payouts are highly pro-cyclical, driven mostly by
net repurchases. These stylized facts will inform the setup of the model. The separate appendix
contains a detailed description of the data.
2.1 Counter-Cyclical Variation in Dividend Yields
The dividend yield on U.S. stocks is highly persistent. The log dividend yield only crosses its
sample mean three times between 1948.I and 2010.IV. However, the dividend yield also has a large
cyclical component. Figure 1 plots the band-pass ﬁltered log dividend yield for the U.S. stock
market. The dividend yield is highly counter-cyclical. The dividend yield peaks in most NBER
recessions, indicated by the shaded areas. The standard deviation of the cyclical component of the
log dividend yield is 7.89% at quarterly frequencies.
The cyclical behavior of the dividend yield is consistent with large increases in expected (excess)
returns during recessions. Lettau and Ludvigson (2010) measure the conditional Sharpe ratio on
U.S. equities by forecasting stock market returns and realized volatility (of stock returns) using
diﬀerent predictors, and they obtain highly countercyclical and volatile Sharpe ratios, with an
annual standard deviation of 50%.
2.2 Cyclical Variation in Corporate Leverage
We deﬁne leverage in the corporate sector (including the ﬁnancial sector) as debt (including de-
posits) divided by debt plus the market value of equity. Leverage in the corporate sector has varied
7substantially in our post-war sample (1952.I -2010.IV). The mean leverage ratio in the sample is
65%, and the standard deviation of leverage is 7.73%. However, the cyclical component of leverage
only has a standard deviation of 1.86% and hence only accounts for less than a quarter of total
volatility. A one standard deviation change in the business cycle component would take leverage
from its mean of 65% to 66.8%.
2.3 Pro-Cyclical Variation in Equity Payouts
Finally, we take a look at aggregate U.S. equity payouts. Equity payouts come in two forms. The
ﬁrst is standard cash dividends, and the second is net repurchases. Equity payouts are sometimes
negative in the data due to the impact of net issuance. The distinction between dividends and
net repurchases matters, because investors must actively buy or sell their equity claims to oﬀset
the impact of the ﬁrm’s repurchases on their portfolio. In the case of cash dividends, they do not;
consuming dividends is suﬃcient. As we will document, the cyclical ﬂuctuations in U.S. equity
payouts are driven largely by net repurchases. The top panel in ﬁgure 2 plots the cyclical variation
in the payouts to U.S. shareholders of publicly traded companies (full line) divided by national
income in the post-war sample (1952.I -2010.IV). Clearly, net payouts tend to drop signiﬁcantly
during most recessions, especially in the second half of the sample. As the ﬁgure shows, this is
entirely driven by net issuance and repurchases rather than dividends (dashed line). The standard
deviation of cyclical payouts is 0.86% over the entire post-war sample, while the standard deviation
of net issuance is 0.85%. We also computed the equity payouts for all U.S. corporations, including
private companies, using Flow of Funds data, plotted in the bottom panel of ﬁgure 2. We found
similar steep declines in payouts to shareholders during recessions. The standard deviation is 0.81%
over the entire sample for net issuance, compared to 0.28% for dividends and 0.86% for total net
payouts. Our ﬁndings are in line with the equity payout facts documented by Larrain and Yogo
(2007) and by Jermann and Quadrini (2011).
In sections 6 and 7, we will develop and test a calibrated model that seeks to match the cyclical
behavior of the dividend yield. In this model, we choose to keep corporate leverage constant,
8to keep the model tractable, and we let debt and equity payouts bear the burden of adjustment
to aggregate consumption growth shocks. While corporate leverage does vary over the business
cycle in the data, this cyclical variation is much smaller than the variation in dividend yields.
Introducing counter-cyclical corporate leverage in the model would mitigate our mechanism.
3 Micro and Macro Evidence on Investor Inertia
While directly held stocks still accounted for 46% of all U.S. equities between 2005-2010 (Source:
Table B100.e, Flow of Funds), the median U.S. investor holds equities mostly in retirement ac-
counts and pooled investment funds such as mutual funds. The 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances
(SCF) reports that only 17.9% of families, mostly wealthy households, have any directly held stocks
in their portfolio while 52.6% of households had retirement accounts. The median holding of di-
rectly held stocks was $17,000, compared to $56,000 for pooled investment funds and $45,000 for
retirement accounts.5 The passive investors in our model will represent the median equity investor,
who mostly holds stocks indirectly.
3.1 Investor Response to Dividends
The response to dividend payments on the part of investors in directly held stocks is markedly
diﬀerent from that of mutual fund investors. The median equity investor, who hold equities mostly
in mutual funds and retirement accounts, tends to simply reinvest dividends in his equity portfolio.
Baker, Nagel, and Wurgler (2007) look at the cross-sectional evidence from U.S. brokerage account
data. For mutual funds, they ﬁnd that a large fraction of households reinvest a large fraction of
dividends. In fact, the median household in their data automatically reinvests all mutual fund
dividends (see p. 263, Baker, Nagel, and Wurgler (2007)). However, they also conclude from the
cross-sectional evidence that ordinary cash dividends from directly held stocks, held mostly by
wealthier households, are withdrawn from the household portfolio at a higher rate than capital
5In the SCF deﬁnition, pooled investment funds exclude money market mutual funds and indirectly held mutual
funds and include all other types of directly held pooled investment funds, such as traditional open-end and closed-
end mutual funds, real estate investment trusts, and hedge funds.
9gains.
3.2 Investor Response to Capital Gains
There is a wealth of evidence indicating that many of these equity investors also behave very
passively in response to capital gains or losses, and rarely adjust the composition of their portfolio.
Brokerage Account Evidence The earliest evidence come from U.S. retirement accounts.
Ameriks and Zeldes (2004) ﬁnd that over a period of 10 years 44% of households in a TIAA-
CREF panel made no changes to either ﬂow or asset allocations, while 17% of households made
only a single change. Recently, Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini (2009), in a comprehensive dataset
of Swedish households, found a weak response of portfolio shares to common variation in returns:
between 1999 and 2002, the equal-weighted share of household ﬁnancial wealth invested in risky
assets drops from 57% to 45% in 2002, which is indicative of very weak re-balancing by the average
Swedish household during the bear market.
Survey Evidence There is also a wealth of survey evidence which is consistent with the notion
that most investors behave very passively. Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics,
Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008) conclude that inertia is the main driver of asset allocation in
U.S. household portfolios, while time-varying risk aversion in response to changes in wealth only
plays a minor role because the portfolio composition does not respond to shocks to liquid wealth
(other than valuation-driven shocks). Furthermore, the Investment Company Institute (ICI) and
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) conducted a survey of over 5000
U.S. household in 2008. They found that among households owning equities 57% of households
had conducted no trades in the past 12 months.6 In addition, Alvarez, Guiso, and Lippi (2011)
summarize the evidence from a 2003 survey of 1,800 Italian households which found that 45%
of these Italian households conducted either one trade or less per year. They conclude that ‘a
6This ﬁgure is consistent with their ﬁndings from earlier surveys conducted in 1998 (58%), 2001 (60%) and 2004
(60%). (See Investment Company Institute: Equity Ownership in America, 2005.)
10component of the adjustment costs faced by investors is information gathering’ which lead to
optimal time-dependent rules, like the ones adhered by the intermittent rebalancers in our model.
Mutual Fund Flow Evidence The aggregate evidence from U.S. mutual fund data is certainly
consistent with this view of the median investor. During the stock market rally from 1990 to 1998,
the share of U.S. equity mutual funds in total assets of the mutual fund industry increased from
23% to 62%. Between 1998 and 2002, after the end of this rally, the equity share dropped to
43%, only to recover and reach 60% in 2006. Between 2007 and 2008, the share dropped again
to 40%. (Source: ICI Factbook, Table 4, year-end total net assets by investment classiﬁcation).
Broadly speaking, there was a huge increase in the equity share during the stock market rally of the
90’s, followed by big declines after the end of the tech boom. Subsequently, there was a recovery
between 2002 and 2007 in the stock market which lifted the share of equity mutual funds, and then
it decreased again during the last two years.
The slow response of the median equity investor to capital gains and losses obviously applies
to equity payouts that accrue in the form of net repurchases and issuance, which account for
most of the cyclical variation in equity payouts. As a result, active investors have to absorb net
repurchases.7 We assume these equity payouts in the model are automatically reinvested by the
passive investors who fail to rebalance, in light of the empirical evidence cited above, but not by
active investors.
4 Model
We consider an endowment economy in which households sequentially trade assets and consume.
All households are ex ante identical, except for the restrictions they face on the menu of assets that
they can trade. These restrictions are imposed exogenously. We refer to the set of restrictions that
a household faces as a household trading technology. The goal of these restrictions is to capture
7Since the model features a constant supply of shares and the adjustment occurs through the supply of bonds,
strictly speaking, equity payouts in the model come only in the form of dividends. However, we could extend the
analysis to allow for shocks to the supply of equity shares.
11the observed portfolio behavior of most households.
We will refer to households as being non-Mertonian traders if they take their portfolio compo-
sition as given and simply choose how much to save or dissave in each period. Other households
optimally change their portfolio in response to changes in the investment opportunity set. We refer
to these traders as Mertonian traders since they actively manage the composition of their portfolio
each period. To solve for the equilibrium allocations and prices, we extend the method developed
by Chien, Cole, and Lustig (2011) to allow for non-Mertonian traders who only intermittently
adjust their portfolio. In this section, we describe the environment and we describe the household
problem for each of the diﬀerent asset trading technologies. We also deﬁne an equilibrium for this
economy.
4.1 Environment
There is a unit measure of households who are subject to both aggregate and idiosyncratic income
shocks. Households are ex ante identical, except for the trading technology they are endowed with.
Ex post, these households diﬀer in terms of their idiosyncratic income shock realizations. All of
the households face the same stochastic process for idiosyncratic income shocks, and all households
start with the same present value of tradeable wealth.
In the model time is discrete, inﬁnite, and indexed by t = 0,1,2,... The ﬁrst period, t = 0, is a
planning period in which ﬁnancial contracting takes place. We use zt ∈ Z to denote the aggregate
shock in period t and ηt ∈ N to denote the idiosyncratic shock in period t. zt denotes the history
of aggregate shocks, and similarly, ηt denotes the history of idiosyncratic shocks for a household.
The idiosyncratic events η are i.i.d. across households with mean one. We use π(zt,ηt) to denote
the unconditional probability of state (zt,ηt) being realized. The events are ﬁrst-order Markov,






Since we can appeal to a law of large number, π(ηt) also denotes the fraction of agents in state
zt that have drawn a history ηt. We introduce some additional notation: zt+1 ￿ zt or ηt+1 ￿ ηt
12means that the left hand side node is a successor node to the right hand side node. We denote by
{zτ ￿ zt} the set of successor aggregate histories for zt including those many periods in the future;
ditto for {ητ ￿ ηt}. When we use ￿, we include the current nodes zt or ηt in the set.
There is a single non-durable goods available for consumption in each period, and its aggregate




with Y0(z0) = 1. This endowment goods comes in two forms. The ﬁrst part is non-diversiﬁable
income that is subject to idiosyncratic risk and it is given by γYt(zt)ηt; hence γ is the share of
income that is non-diversiﬁable. The second part is diversiﬁable income, which is not subject to
the idiosyncratic shock, and is given by (1 − γ)Yt(zt).












where α > 0 denotes the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, and ct(zt,ηt) denotes the household’s
consumption in state (zt,ηt). Henceforth, we suppress the histories zt,ηt in the notation whenever
the history dependence is obvious.
4.2 Assets Traded
Households trade assets in securities markets that re-open every period. These assets are claims
on diversiﬁable income, and the set of traded assets, depending on the trading technology, can
include one-period Arrow securities as well as debt and equity claims. Households cannot directly
trade claims to aggregate non-diversiﬁable income (labor income).
We deﬁne equity as a leveraged claim to aggregate diversiﬁable income ( (1 − γ)Yt(zt)). Cor-
porate leverage is constant in our economy. Instead, the equity payouts will adjust to aggregate
shocks. We use Vt[{X}](zt) to denote the no-arbitrage price of a claim to a payoﬀ stream {X} in
13period t with history zt, and we use Rt+k,t[{X}](zt+k) to denote the gross return between t and
t + k. Rt+1,t[{1}](zt) denotes the one-period risk-free rate. We denote the price of a unit claim to
the ﬁnal good in aggregate state zt+1 acquired in aggregate state zt by Qt(zt+1,zt).
To construct the debt and the equity claim, we assume that aggregate diversiﬁable income in
each period is split into a debt component (aggregate interest payments net of new issuance) and
an equity component (aggregate dividend payments net of new equity issuance denoted Dt(zt)).
For simplicity, the bonds are taken to be one-period risk-free bonds. Since we assume a constant
leverage ratio ψ, the supply of one-period non-contingent bonds Bs




t = ψ [(1 − γ)Vt[{Y }] − B
s
t],
where Vt[{Y }](zt) denotes the value of a claim to aggregate income in node zt. The payout to bond
holders is given by Rt,t−1[1](zt−1)Bs
t−1(zt−1) − Bs
t(zt), and the payments to shareholders, Dt(zt),
are then determined residually as:






In our model, the supply of shares is constant and all equity payouts come exclusively in the form
of dividends. We denote the value of the equity claim as Vt[{D}](zt). Rt,t−1[{D}](zt) denotes the
gross return on the dividend claim between t−1 and t. A trader who invests a fraction ψ/(1+ψ)
in bonds and the rest in debt is holding the market portfolio. The equity payout/output ratio is
given by the following expression:
Dt
Yt














As can easily be veriﬁed, the payout/output ratio is pro-cyclical provided that the price-dividend
ratio of a claim to aggregate (or diversiﬁable) output is. Since our calibrated benchmark model
produces procyclical price/dividend ratios, the equity payout/output ratio inherits this property,
as in the data. Note that these equity payouts can be negative, as is true in the data.
14All households are initially endowed with a claim to their per capita share of both diversiﬁable
and non-diversiﬁable income. In period 1, each agent’s ﬁnancial wealth is constrained by the value
of their claim to tradeable wealth in the period 0 planning period, which is given by:








where both z0 and η0 simply indicate the degenerate starting values for the stochastic income
process.8
4.3 Trading Technology
A trading technology is a restriction on the menu of assets that the agent can trade in any given
period. This includes restrictions on the frequency of trading as well. The set of asset trading
technologies that we consider can be divided into two main classes: Mertonian trading technologies
and non-Mertonian trading technologies. Agents with a Mertonian or active trading technology
optimally choose their portfolio composition given the menu of assets that they are allowed to
trade in each period and given the state of the investment opportunity set. We initially focus
on Mertonian traders who can trade a complete menu of state-contingent securities with payoﬀs
contingent on aggregate but not idiosyncratic shocks, in addition to non-contingent debt and equity.
These trading technologies are superior to non-Mertonian trading technologies that keep the target
composition of their portfolios ﬁxed. Non-Mertonian traders only choose how much to save each
period. We will consider three types of non-Mertonian traders: (i) traders who hold only debt
claims, (ii) traders who hold debt and equity claims in ﬁxed proportion, and (iii) traders who allow
the recent history of equity returns to determine their holdings of debt and equity because they
only periodically rebalance their portfolios, but have a ﬁxed equity share target.
8In the quantitative analysis we only look at the ergodic equilibrium of the economy; hence, the assumptions
about initial wealth are largely irrelevant. We assume that, during the initial trading period, households with
portfolio restriction sell their claim to diversiﬁable income in exchange for their type appropriate ﬁxed weighted
portfolio of bonds and equities.
15Mertonian Trader This Mertonian trader has access to a complete menu of contingent claims on
z and she faces no restrictions on his holdings of bonds and equity. We consider a household entering
the period with net ﬁnancial wealth ˆ at(zt,ηt). This household buys securities in ﬁnancial markets
(state contingent bonds at(zt+1;zt,ηt), non-contingent bonds bt(zt,ηt), and equity shares sD
t (zt,ηt))





t Vt[{D}] + bt + ct ≤ ˆ at + γYtηt for all z
t,η
t,
where ˆ at(zt,ηt), the agent’s net ﬁnancial wealth in state (zt,ηt), is given by his state-contingent
bond payoﬀs, the payoﬀs from his equity position and the non-contingent bond payoﬀs:
ˆ at = at−1(zt) + s
D
t [Dt + Vt[{D}]] + Rt,t−1[1]bt−1. (5)
Finally, the households face exogenous limits on their net asset positions, or solvency constraints,
ˆ at(z
t,η
t) ≥ 0. (6)
Traders cannot borrow against their future labor income.
Non-Mertonians For all non-Mertonian trading technologies, the menu of traded assets only
consists of non-contingent debt and equity claims. We consider a Non-Mertonian household en-
tering the period with net ﬁnancial wealth ˆ at(zt,ηt). This household buys non-contingent bonds
bt(zt,ηt), and equity shares sD
t (zt,ηt)) and consumption ct(zt,ηt) in the good markets subject to
this one-period budget constraint:
s
D
t Vt[{D}] + bt + ct ≤ ˆ at + γYtηt, for all z
t,η
t,
16where ˆ at(zt,ηt), the agent’s net ﬁnancial wealth in state (zt,ηt), is given by the payoﬀs from his
equity position and the non-contingent bond payoﬀs:
ˆ at = s
D
t [Dt + Vt[{D}]] + Rt,t−1[1]bt−1. (7)
Non-Mertonian traders face the same solvency constraints.
A non-Mertonian trading technology also speciﬁes an exogenously assigned and ﬁxed target $?
for the equity share. We refer to these traders as non-Mertonian precisely because the target does
not respond to changes in the investment opportunity set.
There are two types of these non-Mertonian traders. A continuous-rebalancer adjusts his equity
position to the target $? in each period. An intermittent-rebalancer adjusts his equity position
to the target only every n periods; in non-rebalancing periods, all (dis-)savings occur through
adjusting the holdings of the investor’s risk-free asset.9
Continuous-Rebalancing (crb) Trader Non-Mertonian traders re-balance their portfolio
in each period to a ﬁxed fraction $? in levered equity and 1 − $? in non-contingent bonds, and





?Rt,t−1[{D}] + (1 − $
?)Rt,t−1[1]
If $? = 1/(1 + ψ), then this trader holds the market in each period and earns the return on
a claim to all tradeable income: Rt,t−1[{(1 − γ)Y }]. Without loss of generality, we can think of
non-participants as crb traders with $? = 0.
9As in Lynch (1996) and Duﬃe (2010), we assume that investors ﬁx their periods of inattention rather than
solving for the optimal inattention period. Building on earlier work by Duﬃe and Sun (1990) and Gabaix and
Laibson (2002), Abel, Eberly, and Panageas (2006) consider a portfolio problem in which the investor pays a cost to
observe her portfolio, and they show that even small costs can rationalize fairly large intervals in which the household
does not check its portfolio, and ﬁnances its consumption out of the riskless account. We do not endogenize the
decision to observe the value of the portfolio, but, instead, we focus on the aggregate equilibrium implications of
what Abel, Eberly, and Panageas (2006) call ‘stock market inattention’.
17Intermittent-Rebalancing (irb) Trader An irb trader’s technology is deﬁned by his port-
folio target (denoted $?) and the periods in which he rebalances (denoted T ). We assume that
rebalancing takes place at ﬁxed intervals. For example, if he rebalances every other period, then
T = {1,3,5,...} or T = {2,4,6,...}.
We deﬁne the trader’s equity holdings as et(zt,ηt) = sD
t (zt,ηt)Vt[{D}](zt). In re-balancing





However, in non-rebalancing periods, the implied equity share is given by $t = et/(et + bt) where
et evolves according to the following law of motion:
et = et−1Rt,t−1[{D}]
for each t / ∈ T . This assumes that the irb trader automatically re-invests the payouts in equity
in non-rebalancing periods.10 After non-rebalancing periods, the irb trader with an equity share
$t−1(zt−1) earns a rate of return:
R
irb
t ($t−1) = $t−1Rt,t−1[{D}] + (1 − $t−1)Rt,t−1[1].
Since setting T = {1,2,3,...} generates the continuous-rebalancer’s measurability constraint,
the continuous-rebalancer can simply be thought of as a degenerate case of the intermittent-
rebalancer. Hence, we can state without loss of generality that a non-Mertonian trading technology
is completely characterized by ($?,T ). In our quantitative analysis we assume that the set of irb
traders is such that an equal number of them rebalance in every period.
10When the average investor simply consumes the equity payouts, then there is no need for trade in shares
between the average non-Mertonian and the average Mertonian trader. Once the irb trader reinvests the procyclical
equity payouts, then the Mertonian traders have to sell shares after good aggregate shocks and buy shares after bad
aggregate shocks.
184.4 Equilibrium
We assume there is always a non-zero measure of Mertonian traders to guarantee the uniqueness
of the stochastic discount factor. For Mertonian traders, we let µm denote their measure. For non-
Mertonian traders, we denote the measure of irb (crb) traders with µirb (µcrb) and their portfolio
target with $?; for nonparticipants, we use µnp to denote their measure. (The portfolio target of
non-participants is equal to zero.)
















t) = Vt[{(1 − γ)Y − D}], (8)














t) = Vt[{D}], (9)
where we index the holdings of the Mertonian traders, continuous rebalancers, intermittent rebal-
ancers and non-participants respectively by {m,crb,irb,np}.







t) = 0. (10)
An equilibrium for this economy is deﬁned in the standard way. It consists of a list of bond and
dividend claim holdings, a consumption allocation and a list of bond and tradeable output claim
prices such that: (i) given these prices, a trader’s asset and consumption choices maximize her
expected utility subject to the budget constraints, the solvency constraints and the measurability
constraints, and (ii) the asset markets clear (eqs. (8), (9),(10)).
To solve for the equilibrium of our model we develop an extension of the multiplier method
developed by Chien, Cole, and Lustig (2011). They use measurability restrictions to capture
the portfolio restrictions implied by the diﬀerent trading technologies. This leads them to use
19a cumulative Lagrangian multiplier as the relevant household state variable. They develop an
analytic characterization of the household’s share of aggregate consumption and the stochastic
discount factors in terms a single moment of the distribution of these cumulative Lagrangian
multipliers. They then use these results to construct a computational algorithm to solve for an
equilibrium of their model. The key advantage of their methodology is it allows us to solve for
equilibrium allocations and prices without having to search for the equilibrium prices that clear
each security market. Section A in the appendix provides a detailed discussion of how we extend
their methodology to handle intermittent rebalancers.11
4.5 Analytical Experiment
To explain the importance of rebalancing for aggregate risk sharing, we look at a version of our
economy in which aggregate consumption growth is not predictable: π(z0|z) = π(z0). There are no
non-participants in this economy.
Without Idiosyncratic risk In addition, we consider a version of the model without idiosyn-
cratic η shocks (η = 1). The active traders eﬀectively face complete markets, albeit subject to
binding solvency constraints. Finally, we assume that the non-Mertonian traders want to hold
the market portfolio: their target share is $? = 1/(1 + ψ). The complete markets allocation is
characterized by constant consumption shares for all households:
ct(z
t) = b cY (z
t). (11)
11In continuous-time ﬁnance, Cuoco and He (2001) and Basak and Cuoco (1998) used stochastic weighting schemes
to characterize allocations and prices. Our approach diﬀers because it provides a tractable and computationally
eﬃcient algorithm for computing equilibria in environments with a large number of agents subject to idiosyncratic
risk as well as aggregate risk, and heterogeneity in trading technologies. The use of cumulative multipliers in solving
macro-economic equilibrium models was pioneered by Kehoe and Perri (2002), building on earlier work by Marcet
and Marimon (1999). Our use of measurability constraints to capture portfolio restrictions is similar to that in
Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent, and Seppala (2002) and Lustig, Sleet, and Yeltekin (2007), who consider an optimal
taxation problem, while the aggregation result extends that in Chien and Lustig (2010) to an incomplete markets
environment.
20Since all households are ex ante identical, the consumption share is one (b c =1) for all households.
Even with crb passive traders, this allocation can be implemented since the passive traders can
simply hold the market portfolio. In equilibrium, they then consume the dividends from holding
the market portfolio of equity and debt. All asset prices are identical to those that obtain in the
Breeden-Lucas-Rubinstein representative agent economy, since we are implementing the complete
markets allocation. The market price of risk is constant, and so is the risk-free rate.
Next, we consider a version with irb passive traders. The irb trader buys more shares than
usual after high aggregate consumption shocks and buys fewer shares than usual after low aggregate
consumption growth shocks. Why? Consider the case in which 1/3 of irb traders rebalances each
period. Let us start with irb traders who do not rebalance in that period. They account for
2/3 of all irb traders in the calibrated model. The 2/3 of irb traders who do not rebalance that
period re-invest the dividends automatically. Hence, they buy more shares after good aggregate
consumption growth shocks than after bad aggregate consumption growth shocks. This becomes
apparent from the expression for the payout ratio in equation (3). Moreover, the 1/3 of irb traders
who do rebalance do not oﬀset this cyclical buying of shares, because they have a ﬁxed equity
target.
Obviously, the complete markets allocations in equation (11) cannot be implemented. The
non-rebalancing irb trader consumption shares drift down below 1 after good aggregate shocks,
because they buy more shares, and the shares increase above 1 after bad shocks, because they buy
fewer shares, or they even sell shares. As a result, to clear the market, the active traders as a
group sell more shares than usual after high aggregate consumption growth realizations to the irb
traders and they buy more shares than usual after low aggregate consumption growth realizations.
Thus, after a series of negative aggregate consumption growth shocks, the irb’s equity share $t−1
would be much lower than what is required to hold the market, and Rirb
t ($t−1, ˜ zt) is increasingly
less exposed to aggregate consumption risk. In this new equilibrium, the relative wealth of the





t(zt) cannot be invariant w.r.t aggregate shocks.
21With Idiosyncratic risk Next, we consider the same economy, now with idiosyncratic risk.
Diversiﬁable income accounts for a fraction 1 − γ of total wealth. Furthermore, recall that the
distribution of idiosyncratic shocks is independent of aggregate shocks. We assume that the non-
Mertonian traders belong to the class of continuous-rebalancers (crb), and suppose that they hold
the market portfolio: their target share is $? = 1/(1 + ψ). Also, suppose that there are no non-




t) = b ct(η
t)Y (z
t), (12)
where the share b ct does not depend on the history of aggregate shocks zt, but only on the history of
idiosyncratic shocks. This particular consumption path in eq. (12) is feasible for the non-Mertonian
trader simply by trading a claim to aggregate consumption (the market), i.e., maintaining a port-
folio with $? = 1/(1 + ψ) invested in equity. There is in fact an equilibrium in which all agents
only trade claims to aggregate consumption, as shown by Krueger and Lustig (2009). In this
equilibrium, the equity premium is still the Breeden-Lucas-Rubenstein representative agent equity
premium, because all households bear the same amount of aggregate risk, and the market price of
risk is constant.
The logic is the same as before in the economy without idiosyncratic risk, but now it applies
to the average agent. The average agent should simply consume the dividends to hold the market
portfolio. The equity share in his portfolio remains constant at 1/(1 + ψ) if he does so. Instead,
the average irb trader buys more shares than usual after high aggregate consumption shocks
and buys fewer shares than usual after low aggregate consumption growth shocks. As a result,
the active traders as a group sell more shares than usual after high aggregate consumption growth
realizations to the irb traders and they buy more shares than usual after low aggregate consumption
growth realizations. The dynamics of irb equity shares are as described above for the case without
idiosyncratic risk.
Because of the nature of the trading technology, adverse aggregate shocks endogenously con-
centrate aggregate risk among the Mertonian traders. This destroys the constant representative
22agent risk price result in the case of i.i.d. aggregate shocks without non-participants. The p/d
ratio cannot be constant in equilibrium. The risk premium has to increase after bad shocks and
decrease after good shocks.
5 Calibration of Economy
This section discusses the calibration of the parameters. In section 6 and 7, we then evaluate the
calibrated version of the model to examine the extent to which our model can account for the
empirical moments of asset prices, and in particular the counter-cyclical volatility of the market
price of risk.
5.1 Preferences and Endowments
The model is calibrated to annual data. We set the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion α to ﬁve and
the time discount factor β to .95. These preference parameters allow us to match the collaterizable
wealth to income ratio in the data when the tradeable or collateralizable income share 1 − γ is
10%, as discussed below. The average ratio of household wealth to aggregate income in the US is
4.30 between 1950 and 2005. The wealth measure is total net wealth of households and non-proﬁt
organizations (Flow of Funds Tables). With a 10% collateralizable income share, the implied ratio
of wealth to consumption is 5.28 in the model’s benchmark calibration.12
Our benchmark model is calibrated to match the aggregate consumption growth moments from
Alvarez and Jermann (2001). The average consumption growth rate is 1.8% and the standard
deviation is 3.16%. These are the moments of U.S. per capita aggregate consumption between
1889-1978 used in Mehra and Prescott (1985)’s seminal paper. Recessions are less frequent than
expansions: 27% of realizations are low aggregate consumption growth states. The ﬁrst-order
autocorrelation coeﬃcient of aggregate consumption growth (ρz) is zero. Aggregate consumption
12As is standard in this literature, we compare the ratio of total outside wealth to aggregate non-durable consump-
tion in our endowment economy to the ratio of total tradeable wealth to aggregate income in the data. Aggregate
income exceeds aggregate non-durable consumption because of durable consumption and investment.
23growth is identically and independently distributed over time: π(z0|z) = π(z0). The elements of
the discretized process for z are {0.9602,1.0402}.
We calibrate the labor income process as in Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2007), except
that we eliminate the counter-cyclical variation (CCV) of labor income risk. Hence, the variance
of labor income risk is constant in our model. This allows us to focus on the eﬀects of changes in
composition of non-Mertonian traders pool and their target equity share. The Markov process for
the log of the labor income share logη has a standard deviation of 0.71, and its autocorrelation is
0.89. We use a 4-state discretization for both aggregate and idiosyncratic risk. The elements of
the discretized process for η are {0.3894,1.6106}.
Equity in our model is simply a leveraged claim to diversiﬁable income. In the Flow of Funds,
the ratio of corporate debt-to-net worth is around 0.65, suggesting a leverage parameter ψ of 2.
However, Cecchetti, Lam, and Mark (1990) report that standard deviation of the growth rate of
dividends is at least 3.6 times that of aggregate consumption, suggesting that the appropriate
leverage level is over 3. Following Abel (1999) and Bansal and Yaron (2004), we choose to set the
leverage parameter ψ to 3.
5.2 Computation
To compute the equilibrium of this economy, we follow the algorithm described by Chien, Cole, and
Lustig (2011), who use truncated aggregate histories as state variables. We keep track of lagged
aggregate histories up to 7 periods. The details are in section D of the appendix. Our objective is
to examine the response of the moments of equilibrium asset prices, consumption growth, portfolio
returns and the welfare to changes in the frequency of rebalancing by non-Mertonian equity holders
and the level of their equity target.
6 Quantitative Experiments in Calibrated Economy
To illustrate the eﬀect of trading technology on equilibrium prices, we start by using a simpler
version of our economy with only two types of traders. The pool of traders consists of 5% Mertonian
24traders and 95% non-Mertonian traders. These shares represent fractions of human wealth in each
trader pool. The actual distribution of ﬁnancial wealth is endogenous.
We consider two types of non-Mertonian equity holders: (1) those who rebalance every period
(crb) and (2) those who rebalance every 3 years (irb). This level of inertia is modest compared to
what researchers have documented in the data (see, e.g., the evidence reported by Ameriks and
Zeldes (2004), Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini (2009) and Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008)). We
assume that an equal fraction of irb traders rebalances every period.
We consider three simple quantitative experiments. In experiment (1), the non-Mertonian
traders are crb traders who have an equity target of 25% $? = 1/(1 + ψ), and therefore hold
the market, i.e., a claim to aggregate output. In experiment (2), the non-Mertonian traders
are nonparticipants (np). These are eﬀectively crb traders who have equity target $? = 0. In
experiment (3), the non-Mertonian traders are irb traders who hold the market and have an equity
target $? = 1/(1 + ψ). 1/3 of these traders rebalance in each period. The ﬁrst experiments is
similar in spirit to our prior work, Chien, Cole, and Lustig (2011); the second experiment is a
version of Guvenen (2009)’s limited participation economy, while the third experiment highlights
the novel mechanism in this paper.
Table I reports the asset pricing results, where equity is a claim to the payout process D
deﬁned in equation (3). We report the maximum unconditional Sharpe ratio or market price
of risk (
σ(m)
E(m)) the standard deviation of the maximum SR (Std(
σt(m)
Et(m)) ), the equity risk pre-
mium E (Rt+1,t[D] − Rt+1,t[1]), the standard deviation of excess returns σ (Rt+1,t[D] − Rt+1,t[1]),
the Sharpe ratio on equity, the mean risk-free rate E (Rt+1,t[1]) and the standard deviation of the
risk-free rate σ (Rt+1,t[1]). To help us understand the mechanism that is generating these results,
ﬁgure 3 shows a sample path of the equity share of the average Mertonian trader for each of the
three experiments in the top panel and a sample path of non-Mertonian traders in the bottom
panel.
256.1 Continuous Rebalancing Experiment
In the ﬁrst experiment, the combination of a Mertonian traders and non-Mertonian crb traders,
both of which face idiosyncratic and aggregate risk, leads to a low risk free rate of 2.8%, compared
to 12% in the representative agent economy. The risk-free rate is essentially constant, and there
is a modest equity premium of 2.8%, while the Sharpe ratio on equity is also low at 0.19. More
importantly, from our perspective, the market price of risk is constant. This outcome arises in
the crb equilibrium because the equity share in the Mertonian trader’s portfolio is constant, as is
clear from the top panel in ﬁgure 3. Recall that our economy satisﬁes the assumptions we imposed
in the IID example (see subsection 4.5). In this version of the model without non-participants,
the representative agent Breeden-Lucas-Rubinstein risk premium is obtained provided that all
non-Mertonian traders are of the crb type. Furthermore, this BLR risk premium is constant.
In experiment (2) and (3), as we replace the crb traders by non-participants and irb traders
respectively, we see increasingly counter-cyclical equity shares in the next two experiments, which
in turn will impute volatility to risk prices.
6.2 Limited Participation Experiment
In the second experiment, we replace the crb traders with non-participants (np). As is to be
expected, the concentration of aggregate risk delivers an even lower risk-free rate of 1.2%, while
the equity premium increases to 8.4% and the Sharpe ratio on equity is 0.52. Furthermore, we
now see some volatility in the pricing of risk. The standard deviation of the market price increases
from 0 to 5.4%. The amount of aggregate risk being absorbed by the Mertonian trader is relatively
larger in bad times, i.e., after a history of low aggregate consumption growth shocks, rather than
good times due to the savings behavior of the nonparticipant. After each low realization of the
aggregate growth shock zt, the wealth of non-participants increases relative to average wealth. As
a result, after each bad shock, the Mertonian trader has to take a more levered position in equities
to oﬀset the larger bond position of the nonparticipants. This is shows in the top panel of ﬁgure 3.
266.3 Intermittent Rebalancing Experiment
Finally, in the third experiment, we replace the crb traders with the irb traders. The average risk-
free rate is very similar to the crb case, while the equity premium and the market price of risk are
slightly lower than in the crb case. However, the key change that results from the insertion of the
irb traders is the much higher volatility of risk pricing. The standard deviation of the market price
of risk increases to 13.6, up from 5.4%. The bottom panel of ﬁgure 3 shows that the equity share
of the irb traders drops after low aggregate consumption growth shocks, forcing the Mertonian
traders to lever up even more, as is clear from the top panel. The equity share of the average
irb trader is highly pro-cyclical. This leads him to absorb more aggregate risk after a history of
high aggregate consumption growth shocks, and less after a series of low aggregate consumption
growth shocks, relative to the crb trader whose equity share does not vary. This in turn renders
the amount of aggregate risk being absorbed by the Mertonian trader, who is on the other side of
these trades, to be counter-cyclical. As a result, the price of risk has to be counter-cyclical as well
to clear all securities markets. The bottom panel clearly shows how relatively small movements in
the irb traders’ average share can lead to fairly large ﬂuctuations in the volatility of risk pricing if
there many non-Mertonian traders and not very many Mertonian traders.
6.4 Relative Scarcity of Mertonian Capital
One of the key factors in generating volatility in the equity shares of Mertonian traders, and hence
in the volatility of risk prices, is the small fraction of Mertonian traders in our example: only 5% of
human wealth is held by Mertonian traders. To illustrate this, we increased the share of Mertonian
traders in our third example from 5% to 50%, and we correspondingly reduced the share of irb
traders to 50%. The moments of asset prices obtained in this case are reported in the last column
of Table I. The volatility in the equity shares of the Mertonian traders largely disappears (not
shown in Table), and as a result the volatility of the market price of risk drops to 0.72%.
277 Quantitative Results in Benchmark Economy
In our benchmark economy, we have three diﬀerent types of traders. As was illustrated using
these experiments, each of these serves a distinct purpose in our mechanism. The concentration of
aggregate risk by non-participants allows us to match the level of risk premia while the irb traders
impute countercyclical volatility to risk premia. We start by calibrating the size of the trader
pools in section 7.1. The calibration of all other parameters is unchanged, as is the frequency of
rebalancing for irb traders; they rebalance every three years. Importantly, aggregate consumption
growth is i.i.d. and the cross-sectional variance of idiosyncratic risk is constant. Section 7.2
describes the moments of asset prices in the benchmark economy. In section 7.3 and 7.4, we
document the countercyclicality of Sharpe ratios and dividend yields. Finally, section 7.5 describes
the model’s implications for the distribution of wealth and consumption, while 7.6.1 and 7.6.2 focus
on changes in the relative supply of Mertonian and non-Mertonian capital.
7.1 Trader Pool Composition
In the most recent Survey of Consumer Finances, 51.1% of households reported owning stocks
directly or indirectly. Therefore, the fraction of non-Mertonian traders with zero equity holding
(non-participants) is calibrated to 50%. In order to deliver a large equity premium, a small fraction
of Mertonian traders need to bear the residual aggregate risk created by non-participant. Hence,
we set the share of Mertonian traders equal to 5%, and non-Mertonian traders who hold equities to
45%. These shares represent fractions of total human wealth, not ﬁnancial wealth, owned by each
trader type.13 In the case with irb traders, the optimal target equity share of irb traders turns out
to 41%. This will be our benchmark.
13Because of the homogeneity of the investor’s optimization problem, we can reallocate human wealth within each
trader pool without aﬀecting equilibrium asset prices.
287.2 Moments of Asset Prices
Table II reports moments of asset prices generated by simulating data from a model with 3,000
agents for 10,000 periods, where, as before, equity is a claim to the payout process D deﬁned in
equation (3). The table considers two cases: one with 45% crb trader and the other with 45%
irb trader. In the upper part of Table II, we report the maximum unconditional Sharpe ratio or
market price of risk (
σ(m)
E(m)), the standard deviation of the maximum SR (Std(
σt(m)
Et(m)) ), the equity risk
premium E (Rt+1,t[D] − Rt+1,t[1]), the standard deviation of excess returns σ (Rt+1,t[D] − Rt+1,t[1]),
the Sharpe ratio on equity, the mean risk-free rate E (Rt+1,t[1]) and the standard deviation of the
risk-free rate σ(Rt+1,t[1]). In the lower part of Table II, we report the standard deviation of the
conditional risk premium on equity Std[Et (Rt+1,t[D] − Rt+1,t[1])], the standard deviation of the
conditional volatility of risk premium on equity Std[σt (Rt+1,t[D] − Rt+1,t[1])] and the standard
deviation of the conditional SR on equity Std[SRt].
CRB In the case with crb traders, the maximum SR is 0.304 and the standard deviation of the
maximum SR is 6.11%. The equity premium is 4.35% and the Sharpe ratio on equity is 0.29. The
average risk-free rate is 2.35% and its volatility is 0.20%. Finally, we also decompose the variation
in the SR on equity; the standard deviation of the conditional risk premium on equity is 0.86%, the
standard deviation of the conditional volatility is 0.134% and this produces a standard deviation
of the conditional SR is 6.11%.
IRB In the case with irb traders, the maximum SR is 0.29 and the standard deviation of the
maximum SR is 14.06%. This represents a 230% increase in the volatility. The equity premium
drops to 4.16% while the standard deviation of stock returns increases to 16.45%. The Sharpe ratio
on equity drops to 0.25. The moments of the risk-free rate are virtually unchanged. So, while the
unconditional risk premia are lower in the economy with intermittent rebalancing, the volatility of
conditional risk premia triples, and the behavior of interest rates is largely unaﬀected.
The intermittent rebalancing behavior also increases the volatility of conditional moments on
equity returns signiﬁcantly. The standard deviation of the conditional risk premium increases from
290.86% to 2.19%, the standard deviation of the conditional volatility increases from 0.134 to 0.35%,
and the standard deviation of the conditional SR on equity increases from 6.11% to 14.06%.
Since corporate leverage is ﬁxed, the equilibrium equity payout process changes when we sub-
stitute irb for crb traders. However, our results are not driven by the change in the payout process.
When we instead adopt the payout/output D/Y process for the crb case and compute the resulting
irb equilibrium , the volatility of the market price of risk still increases to 13.36%, which is only
marginally lower than the 14.06% outcome in the benchmark economy with constant corporate
leverage. So, it is the nature of traders that drives our results.
To help assess the strength of our mechanism, we can use the implied standard deviation of
the market price of risk in an annual calibration of the Campbell and Cochrane (1999) external
habit model as a benchmark, with the same i.i.d aggregate consumption growth process as in our
economy. All of the other parameters are taken directly from Campbell and Cochrane (1999).
In this annual calibration of their model, the standard deviation of the market price of risk is
21%. In our benchmark economy with CRRA (constant relative risk aversion) agents, our model
generates 14.06%, 1/3 less than the external habits model. However, as we will show in section 8,
the volatility generated by our model increases to 25.11% if we introduce predictability in aggregate
consumption growth.
Figure 5 plots a 100-year simulation of the equity share (full line) of the Mertonian trader in
the case with irb traders in the top panel; the bottom panel shows the case with crb traders. The
shaded areas are low aggregate consumption growth states, and the dashed line is a 4-period moving
average of aggregate consumption growth. Clearly, there is much more counter-cyclical variation
in the equity share of the Mertonian traders in the irb case, especially on the downside. This
variation in the equity share of the Mertonian traders is the driving force behind our ampliﬁcation
mechanism.
307.3 Countercyclical Variation in Risk Prices
The variation in market price of risk created by the irb traders is counter-cyclical; it mirrors the
variation in the active trader’s equity share. Figure 6 plots the conditional Sharpe ratio on equity
against the history of aggregate consumption growth shocks for the benchmark case. The shaded
areas denote the low aggregate consumption growth realizations. The dotted line shows 4-period
moving average of aggregate consumption growth; the full line shows the conditional Sharpe ratio.
In the irb case, the conditional risk premium on equity increases with each low aggregate con-
sumption growth realization, and decreases with each high aggregate consumption growth realiza-
tion. The conditional Sharpe ratio on equity is even more counter-cyclical, because the conditional
volatility decreases with each negative aggregate consumption growth realization, as shown in the
bottom panel of ﬁgure 7. In the data, the conditional mean and standard deviation of stock returns
are negatively correlated, according to Lettau and Ludvigson (2010). Our model can replicate these
dynamics.
Figure 8 shows this in a scatter plot representation of the same 100 simulations, with the
weighted average of aggregate consumption growth shocks on the x-axis and the conditional Sharpe
ratio. On the other hand, in the crb case, shown in ﬁgure 9, the conditional Sharpe ratio is only
weakly counter-cyclical.
7.4 Dividend Yields
Our mechanism generates counter-cyclical variation in risk premia and dividend yields (divi-
dend/price (Div/P) ratios). However, this variation is not persistent enough to match the behavior
of the dividend yield and the predictability of stock returns over longer horizons. The failure of
our model to match the persistence of the dividend yield is not surprising. In our model, most of
the variation in risk premia occurs at business cycle frequencies. In the data, there is a substantial
amount of variation in the price dividend ratio at lower frequencies.
The investment strategy considered here is to buy-and-hold a ﬁxed number of shares, and re-
ceive dividends Div. Since equity payouts in our model can be negative, as in the data, we need to
31deﬁne a non-negative dividend process to study log dividend yields. Here, we follow Abel (1999)
and we model the dividends as a levered version of aggregate consumption, with dividend growth
determined by the following equation: ∆logDiv−E(∆logDiv) = λ[∆logC − E(∆logC)]. Pric-
ing this redundant security is straightforward. The leverage parameter λ is 3.
Table III lists the results for the benchmark economy. In the case of irb traders, the standard
deviation of the log dividend yield is 3.27%, compared to 1.74% in the economy with crb traders.
Still, in the data, the standard deviation of the cyclical component of the log dividend yield is 7.73%
in the quarterly data (CRSP NYSE-AMEX-NASDQ 1945-2010). Figure 10 plots a time series of
the dividend yield against aggregate consumption growth shocks. Importantly, the variation in
dividend yields produced by our model is strongly counter-cyclical. The top panel shows the
results in the case of leverage is 3. When we increase leverage to 4, the volatility of the log
dividend yield increases to 4.60%, which brings us closer to the 7.73% target.
Even though our mechanism contributes a lot of volatility to risk premia, most of this variation
is temporary in nature. As a result, the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation coeﬃcient of the log dividend
yield actually is only 0.55 in the irb benchmark, down from 0.75 in the crb case. In the data, the
autocorrelation of the log dividend yield is 0.93. However, if we allow for a structural break in the
dividend yield in 1991, following Lettau and Van Nieuwerburgh (2007), the autocorrelation in the
data is 0.77. As a result of this lack in persistence in risk premia and the dividend yield, our model
cannot match the predictability of equity returns at longer horizons in U.S. data (see section F.1
in the separate appendix for separate results).
7.5 Portfolio, Wealth, Consumption and Welfare Costs
The ﬁrst panel in Table IV reports the moments of household portfolio returns in the benchmark
case. In the irb case, the Mertonian traders realize an excess return of 2.80% and a SR of 0.29,
compared to only 2.81% and 0.26 respectively for the irb trader. The optimal average portfolio
share for a non-Mertonian irb trader is only 41% (compared to 51% in the crb case), because the
equity premium is lower.
32We also evaluate the welfare cost of being a non-Mertonian crb or irb trader. This cost is
measured by the percentage of consumption compensation to Mertonian traders so that they are
indiﬀerence to become non-Mertonian traders. Given the optimal equity share target in each case,
the welfare cost of being a non-Mertonian irb trader in the irb case is three times higher than
that in the crb case (3.50% vs. 1.13%) because the risk premium is much more volatile and hence
the cost of not responding to variation in the investment opportunity set is much larger. We also
report the welfare cost of being an irb trader compared to a crb trader holding ﬁxed the equity
share target at 41%. The cost is small (0.33%) and positive: an irb trader would give up a 0.33%
of her consumption in order to become a crb trader.
On the other hand, an irb trader –setting his target share optimally– would be willing to pay
0.55% of consumption to become a crb trader who can optimally choose his target. This number
is the diﬀerence between 3.50% (reported as the welfare cost(%) of irb to z at the optimal equity
share for irb) and 2.95% in Table IV (reported as the welfare cost(%) of crb to z at the optimal
equity share for crb). This 0.55% number is the true cost of not rebalancing. It is small relative
to the cost of not responding to changes in the investment opportunity set. The costs of not
rebalancing are small; the costs of having a ﬁxed equity target are large.
The second panel in Table IV reports the moments of household consumption growth, and
the moments of aggregate consumption growth for each group of traders. In the crb case, the
volatility of household consumption growth is inversely related to the degree of sophistication of
the trader: 3.24% for Mertonian traders, 3.34% for the crb traders and 3.60% for non-participants.
However, the relation between consumption volatility and trader sophistication reverses itself at
the group level. The volatility for the Mertonian trader segment is 1.48%, compared to 1.22% for
the non-Mertonian equity holders, and 0.72% for the non-participants. These results highlight the
fact that these traders are exposed to diﬀerent types of risk. Mertonian traders are more exposed
to aggregate risk, and non-Mertonian traders are more subject to idiosyncratic risk.
Now, in the case of the irb traders, the volatility of the Mertonian trader’s consumption growth
(at the group level) decreases to 1.43%, while, at the household level, the volatility of household
33consumption growth for non-Mertonian equity holders decreases from 3.34% to 3.28%. Other than
that, the second moment of consumption is very similar to crb case at both individual and group
level. Overall, what is striking is how similar the unconditional moments are in the case of crb and
irb traders, both in terms of portfolio returns and household consumption. The main quantitative
diﬀerence is the increase in the volatility of household consumption growth for the non-Mertonian
equity holders.
Finally, the third panel in Table IV reports the household wealth statistics. The Mertonian
trader accumulates 1.35 times as much wealth as the average household in the baseline crb case,
while the non-Mertonian trader accumulates 1.14 times as much, and the non-participant only 0.83
times the average. These fractions are virtually unchanged in the irb case. However, the wealth
of the non-Mertonian trader (expressed as a fraction of average wealth) becomes more volatile – it
increases from 18% to 28%.
Our model has reasonable cross-sectional consumption implications. In our model, Mertonian
investors load up on aggregate consumption risk, earn higher portfolio return and end up richer.
This is consistent with the data. The consumption of the 10% wealthiest households is 5 times
more exposed to aggregate consumption growth than that of the average US household (Parker and
Vissing-Jorgensen (2009)). Malloy, Moskowitz, and Vissing-Jorgensen (2009) ﬁnd that the average
consumption growth rate for stock-holders is between 1.4 and 2 times as volatile as that of non-
stock holders. They also ﬁnd that aggregate stockholder consumption growth for the wealthiest
segment (upper third) is up to 3 times as sensitive to aggregate consumption growth shocks as
that of non-stock holders.
7.6 Supply of Capital
Our model produces novel implications for changes in capital supplied by investors with diﬀerent
trading technologies. We start by considering changes in the supply of non-Mertonian capital in
the form of variation in these investors’ target equity shares. Next, we consider changes in the
supply of Mertonian capital. Finally, we take a look at the empirical evidence in U.S. data.
347.6.1 Supply of non-Mertonian Capital
The participation of non-Mertonian traders tends to increase the volatility in risk premia. In our
model, this mechanism operates in two ways: (i) as we shift non-Mertonian traders from the crb
type to the irb type and (ii) as we increase the target share of equity in the non-Mertonian trader’s
portfolio. We discuss both of these eﬀects below.
Table V varies the target equity share from 35% to 45%. The ﬁrst panel reports result for
the case when the target equity share of the non-Mertonian trader $? is 35%, the second panel
considers the case of a 40% target share, and ﬁnally, the last panel looks at the case of 45%.
As we increase the equity holdings of the non-Mertonian equity traders from 35% to 45%, the
average market price of risk, the equity premium and the Sharpe ratio all decrease. This is the
standard eﬀect of an increase in stock market participation: aggregate risk being spread out over
a larger pool of investors.
But, there is non-standard volatility eﬀect as well. Increasing the target share of equity for Non-
Mertonian equity traders increases the volatility substantially, from 5.16% in the crb case (10.79%
in the irb case), with 35% target equity share (see left panel of Table V), to 6.78% (15.46%) with
45% target share (see right panel of Table V). This volatility eﬀect is new.
In sum, the more equity non-Mertonian traders hold, the higher is the volatility of risk prices. A
10 percentage point increase in the target share for equities delivers a 50% increase in the volatility
of risk prices. As we increase the target equity share to 45%, the equity risk premium actually
turns negative after a series of high aggregate consumption growth shocks. This explains why the
volatility of the Sharpe ratio surpasses that of the market price of risk.
7.6.2 Supply of Mertonian capital
The volatility of risk premia depends critically on the size of the Mertonian trader pool. We ﬁx
the target equity share at 41%. As we grow the size of the Mertonian trader pool, the volatility of
the market price of risk decreases at a fast rate. Table VI reports the conditional moments in the
case of a 10% Mertonian trader pool (up from 5% in the benchmark case).
35The ampliﬁcation channel is still operative, but the eﬀect is smaller. In the case with 10%
Mertonian traders, the volatility of the market price of risk is 3.34%, and this number increases
to 6.70% when we replace the crb traders with irb traders. In the benchmark case with only 5%
Mertonian traders, these numbers were 6.11% and 14.06% respectively, as reported in Table II. So,
the ampliﬁcation channel has weakened considerably. The standard deviation of the conditional
Sharpe ratio on equity is exactly equal to the standard deviation of the market price of risk in all
cases considered.
7.6.3 Changes in the Supply of Capital to U.S. Equity Markets
Variation in the relative supply of non-Mertonian capital driven by changes in the stock market
participation rate may help us to understand long-term swings in U.S. stock market volatility that
seem disconnected from the underlying macro volatility. In 1927, stockholders represented 3.4-5
percent of the population. By 1930, this fraction had doubled to 7.3-8.9 percent (Source: Perlo
(1958)), thus dramatically expanding the supply of slow-moving capital to U.S. equity markets. At
the same time, the supply of fast-moving capital was presumably much smaller than it is today. The
U.S. economy subsequently witnessed a sizeable, long-lasting increase in stock market volatility,
starting in the 30’s, which lasted well into the next decade. Long-term volatility, measured by
an 8-year moving average of (annualized) daily stock return standard deviations shown in ﬁgure
11, peaked in 1931 at 28% per annum. Subsequently, the participation rate decreased back to 4.1
percent by 1952, while long-term volatility in the stock market fell back to 10 percent per annum.
There was a second wave of increased participation starting in the 70’s. In 1970, the percentage
of families holding stocks was 25%. By 1989, this fraction had increased to 31.7%. After that,
during the 90’s, there was large uninterrupted increase to 48.9% in 1998 and 51.9% in 2000. This
second, steep increase in stock market participation was followed by another increase in long-term
volatility from a low of 11% in the late 80’s to 18% in 2006 (Source: Direct and Indirect Holdings of
Stocks in Survey of Consumer Finances), while overall macro volatility was trending down during
the 90’s and the ﬁrst half of the 00’s.
368 Quantitative Results in Mehra-Prescott Economy
In our benchmark economy, aggregate consumption growth is not predictable. This section relaxes
this restriction. By allowing for additional sources of stock price volatility in the economy with
crb traders, the ampliﬁcation delivered by the switch to irb traders grows larger. This extension
of the baseline model get us closer to our targets in the data.
Mehra and Prescott (1985) choose to match the ﬁrst-order serial correlation (ρz) of the growth
rate of U.S. per capita aggregate consumption between 1889-1978. The sample values for the
U.S. economy is -0.14. When we adopt Mehra and Prescott (1985)’s calibration of the aggregate
consumption growth process, the model delivers an equity premium of 7.8 % and a maximum
Sharpe ratio of 0.41. More importantly, the standard deviation of the market price of risk increases
to 25.11% (8.4%) in the irb (crb) case. Hence, the ampliﬁcation, as we replace the crb traders with
irb traders, increases from 2.3 to 3 times. Furthermore, the volatility of the log dividend yield, with
leverage 3, is 6.4%, just short of our empirical target of 7.7%. When leverage is 4, the volatility of
the dividend yield is 8.03%. Hence, allowing for other sources of price volatility strengthens our
ampliﬁcation mechanism considerably. Other sources (e.g., habit preferences, long run risks etc.)
would have similar eﬀects.
This version of the model with irb traders produces an equilibrium wealth distribution with fat
tails (kurtosis is 4.24), while its crb counterpart does not (kurtosis is 3.26). Hence, intermittent
re-balancing may be an additional factor contributing to wealth inequality. This deserves to be
explored further.
9 Conclusion
Our paper shows that slow-moving capital supplied by intermittent portfolio re-balancers should be
considered as an important contributing factor to the puzzling volatility of Sharpe ratios in equity
markets. Our welfare cost calculations suggest that small costs might suﬃce to deter households
from continuously re-balancing. However, the aggregate impact on equilibrium asset prices is large.
37This makes it an appealing friction.
Secular changes in the volatility of U.S. stock returns that seem disconnected from the un-
derlying macro volatility lend some support to the mechanism that we have uncovered. In the
30’s and 90’s, periods of sustained volatility in the U.S. stock market were preceded by an in-
crease in the supply of slow-moving capital. During the 40’s, 50’s and 60’s, which were periods
of relative calm in the stock markets, the supply of slow-moving capital was much smaller. These
dynamics are consistent with the predictions of our model generated by changes in the supply
of non-Mertonian (subsection (7.6.1)) and Mertonian capital (subsection (7.6.2)). Gains in stock
market participation, without commensurate increases in the supply of fast-moving capital, may
inevitably contribute to increased stock market volatility as well as decreases in the risk premium.
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43Table I: Moments of Asset Prices: Simple Economy
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
target equity share ($?) 25% 25%
Non-Mertonian equity holder crb np irb irb
Mertonian 5% 5% 5% 50%
Non-Mertonian crb 95% 0% 0% 0%
Non-Mertonian irb 0% 0% 95% 50%
Non-Mertonian np 0% 95% 0% 0%
σ(M)






0.0157 5.399 13.630 0.716
E (Rt+1,t[D] − Rt+1,t[1]) 2.795 8.435 2.379 2.792
σ (Rt+1,t[D] − Rt+1,t[1]) 14.50 16.29 16.432 14.674
Sharpe Ratio 0.192 0.517 0.144 0.190
E (Rt+1,t[1]) 2.745 1.219 2.845 2.734
σ (Rt+1,t[1]) 0.010 0.155 0.204 0.025
Std[SRt] 0.0157 5.399 13.630 0.716
Moments of annual returns. The irb traders re-balance every three periods in a staggered fashion (1/3 each year). The target equity
share is 25%. Parameters: α = 5, β = 0.95, collateralized share of income is 10%. The results are generated by simulating an economy
with 3,000 agents and 10,000 periods.
Table II: Moments of Asset Prices: Benchmark Economy
target equity share ($?) 41%
Non-Mertonian equity holder crb irb
Mertonian 5% 5%
Non-Mertonian crb 45% 0%
Non-Mertonian irb 0% 45%









E (Rt+1,t[D] − Rt+1,t[1]) 4.353 4.166
σ (Rt+1,t[D] − Rt+1,t[1]) 14.708 16.451
Sharpe Ratio 0.296 0.253
E (Rt+1,t[1]) 2.356 2.412
σ (Rt+1,t[1]) 0.200 0.286
Std[Et (Rt+1,t[D] − Rt+1,t[1])] 0.860 2.193
Std[σt (Rt+1,t[D] − Rt+1,t[1])] 0.134 0.355
Std[SRt] 6.116 14.068
Moments of annual returns. The irb traders re-balance every three periods in a staggered fashion (1/3 each year). Parameters: α = 5,
β = 0.95, collateralized share of income is 10%. The results are generated by simulating an economy with 3,000 agents.
44Table III: Moments of Equity returns and the Dividend Yield: Benchmark Economy
Non-Mertonian equity holder crb irb
Mertonian 5% 5%
Non-Mertonian crb 45% 0%
Non-Mertonian irb 0% 45%
Non-Mertonian np 50% 50%
Leverage 3
E (Rt+1,t[CD] − Rt+1,t[1]) 3.614 3.504
σ (Rt+1,t[CD] − Rt+1,t[1]) 12.169 13.653
Sharpe ratio 0.297 0.257
σ (pd[CD]) 1.737 3.268
ρ(pd[CD]) 0.749 0.550
Leverage 4
E (Rt+1,t[CD] − Rt+1,t[1]) 4.889 4.734
σ (Rt+1,t[CD] − Rt+1,t[1]) 16.451 18.377
Sharpe ratio 0.297 0.258
σ (pd[CD]) 2.536 4.595
ρ(pd[CD]) 0.750 0.551
Notes: The investment strategy is to buy-and-hold a ﬁxed number of shares and to receive dividends with growth rate ∆logDiv −
E(∆logDiv) = λ[∆logC − E(∆logC)]. In the top panel, the leverage parameter λ is 3. In the bottom panel, the leverage parameter λ
is 4. This table reports moments of annual returns conditional on history of aggregate shocks zt. The irb traders re-balance every three
periods in a staggered fashion (1/3 each year). Parameters: α = 5, β = 0.95, collateralized share of income is 10%. Results for 41%
equity share non-Mertonian target ($?). The results are generated by simulating an economy with 3,000 agents and 10,000 periods.
45Table IV: Moments of Household Portfolio Returns and Consumption: Benchmark Economy
Non-Mertonian equity holder crb irb
Mertonian 5% 5%
Non-Mertonian crb 45% 0%
Non-Mertonian irb 0% 45%
Non-Mertonian np 50% 50%
Panel I: Household Portfolio
Excess Return
Mertonian Trader 2.801 2.818
Non-Mertonian Equity Holder 1.788 1.684
Sharpe Ratio
Mertonian Trader 0.291 0.259
Non-Mertonian Equity Holder 0.297 0.245
Additional Stats
Optimal Equity Share for irb 0.510 0.410
Welfare cost(%) of irb to z at optimal equity share for irb 1.138 3.500
Optimal Equity Share for crb 0.680 0.560
Welfare cost(%) of crb to z at optimal equity share for crb 0.777 2.957
Welfare cost(%) of irb to crb at 41% equity share −0.107 0.338
Panel II Household Consumption
Std. Dev. at Household level
Mertonian Trader 3.248 3.283
Non-Mertonian Equity Holder 3.345 3.285
Non-Mertonian non-participant 3.608 3.602
Std. Dev. of Group Average
Mertonian Trader 1.485 1.436
Non-Mertonian Equity Holder 1.228 1.252
Non-Mertonian non-participant 0.720 0.718
Panel III: Household Wealth
Average Household Wealth Ratio
Mertonian Trader 1.355 1.315
Non-Mertonian Equity Holder 1.147 1.157
Non-Mertonian non-participant 0.832 0.827
Stdev. of Household Wealth Ratio
Mertonian Trader 0.180 0.282
Non-Mertonian Equity Holder 0.086 0.111
Non-Mertonian non-participant 0.089 0.093
Stdev. of Aggregate Equity Share
Non-Mertonian Equity Holder 0.025 0.071
Correlation of Aggregate Equity Share
Non-Mertonian Equity Holder 0.059 0.498
Panel I reports moments of household portfolio returns, Panel II reports moments of household consumption, and Panel III reports
moments of household wealth: we report the average excess returns on household portfolios and the Sharpe ratios, we report the standard
deviation of household consumption growth (as a multiple of the standard deviation of aggregate consumption growth), and we report
the standard deviation of group consumption growth (as a multiple of the standard deviation of aggregate consumption growth); the last
panel reports the average household wealth ratio, as a share of total wealth, and the standard deviation of the household wealth ratio.
Results for 41% equity share non-Mertonian target ($?).The irb traders re-balance every three periods in a staggered fashion (1/3 each
year). Parameters: α = 5, β = 0.95, collateralized share of income is 10%. The results are generated by simulating an economy with
3,000 agents and 10,000 periods.
46Table V: Target Equity Shares and Moments of Asset Prices: Benchmark Economy
equity share target ($?) 35% 40% 45%
Non-Mertonian equity holder crb irb crb irb crb irb
Mertonian 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5%
Non-Mertonian crb 45% 0% 45% 0% 45% 0%
Non-Mertonian irb 0% 45% 0% 45% 0% 45%
Non-Mertonian np 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50%
σ(M)






5.164 10.795 5.943 13.906 6.783 15.466
E (Rt+1,t[D] − Rt+1,t[1]) 5.844 5.670 4.797 4.512 3.531 3.156
σ (Rt+1,t[D] − Rt+1,t[1]) 14.888 15.909 14.813 16.578 14.817 17.122
Sharpe Ratio 0.393 0.356 0.324 0.272 0.238 0.184
E (Rt+1,t[1]) 1.993 2.059 2.249 2.332 2.556 2.654
σ (Rt+1,t[1]) 0.147 0.227 0.183 0.257 0.215 0.304
Std[Et (Rt+1,t[D] − Rt+1,t[1])] 0.722 1.677 0.839 2.201 0.964 2.622
Std[σt (Rt+1,t[D] − Rt+1,t[1])] 0.133 0.130 0.131 0.301 0.169 0.638
Std[SRt] 5.164 10.795 5.944 13.906 6.783 16.275
Std[log(e)](%) 0.069 0.069 0.059 0.071 0.066 0.086
This table reports moments of annual returns. The irb traders re-balance every three periods in a staggered fashion (1/3 each year).
Parameters: α = 5, β = 0.95, collateralized share of income is 10%. The results are generated by simulating an economy with 3,000
agents and 10,000 periods.
Table VI: Conditional Moments and size of Mertonian Trader Pool: Benchmark Economy
Non-Mertonian equity holder crb irb
Mertonian 10% 10%
Non-Mertonian crb 40% 0%
Non-Mertonian irb 0% 40%









Std[Et (Rt+1,t[D] − Rt+1,t[1])] 0.458 0.972
Std[σt (Rt+1,t[D] − Rt+1,t[1])] 0.130 0.212
Std[SRt] 3.337 6.696
This table reports moments of annual returns conditional on history of aggregate shocks zt. The irb traders re-balance every three
periods in a staggered fashion (1/3 each year). Parameters: α = 5, β = 0.95, collateralized share of income is 10%. Results for 41%
equity share non-Mertonian target ($?). The results are generated by simulating an economy with 3,000 agents of each types and
10,000 periods.
47Figure 1: Business Cycle Variation in log Dividend Yield.
Filtered log dividend yield in deviation from the mean plotted against NBER recessions (shaded areas). Quarterly data from CRSP VW
index for AMEX-NASDAQ-NYSE. We applied a Baxter-King bandpass ﬁlter that returns component with periods between 1.5 and 8
yrs assuming no drift and no unit root. We used K = 8 lags.









Figure 2: Business Cycle Variation in Payouts of Publicly Traded Firms to U.S. Shareholders.
The full line plots the ﬁltered annualized net payouts to shareholders scaled by aggregate national income (current dollars). The dashed
line plots dividends dividend by national income. The top panel uses quarterly data from CRSP VW index for AMEX-NASDAQ-NYSE.
The bottom panel uses quarterly data from the Flow of Funds. National income data from BEA Table 1.12. Net payouts is deﬁned as
cash dividends minus net issuance. We applied a Baxter-King bandpass ﬁlter that returns the component with periods between 1.5 and
8 yrs assuming no drift and no unit root. We used K = 8 lags.


















48Figure 3: Equity Shares of Mertonian and Non-Mertonian Traders: Simple Economy
Results for three experiments in simple economy. The top panel shows the equity shares of the Mertonian traders for experiment
(1)-(3). The bottom panel shows the equity shares of the non-Mertonian traders. This calibration has 5% Mertonian traders and 95%
non-Mertonian traders. The irb traders re-balance every three periods in a staggered fashion (1/3 each year). Parameters: α = 5,
β = 0.95, collateralized share of income is 10%. The results are generated by simulating an economy with 3,000 agents.






















Figure 4: The Supply of Mertonian Capital and Equity Shares of Mertonian Traders: Simple
Economy
Results for three experiments in simple economy. The panel shows the equity shares of the Mertonian traders for the case of 5%
Mertonian traders and 95% non-Mertonian traders (experiment (iii)), and the case of 50% z-complete traders and 50% non-Mertonian
traders. The irb traders re-balance every three periods in a staggered fashion (1/3 each year). Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2007)
calibration of idiosyncratic shocks without CCV; Alvarez and Jermann (2001) calibration of aggregate consumption growth shocks. The
target equity share is 25%. Parameters: α = 5, β = 0.95, collateralized share of income is 10%. The results are generated by simulating
an economy with 3,000 agents.
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49Figure 5: Equity Share of Mertonian Trader: Benchmark Economy
The full line shows the equity share for the Mertonian trader (axis on the left hand side). The dashed line is a 4-period moving average
of aggregate consumption growth with linearly decreasing weights. This calibration has 50% non-participants, 5% Mertonian and 45%
either crb or irb traders. The target equity share is 41%. The irb traders re-balance every three periods in a staggered fashion (1/3
each year). Parameters: α = 5, β = 0.95, collateralized share of income is 10%. The results are generated by simulating an economy
with 3,000 agents.
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50Figure 6: Conditional Sharpe Ratio: Benchmark Economy
The full line is the conditional Sharpe ratio (on the left hand side axis). The dashed line is a 4-period moving average of aggregate
consumption growth with linearly decreasing weights. This calibration has 50% non-participants, 5% Mertonian and 45% either in crb
or irb traders. The target equity share is 41%. The irb traders re-balance every three periods in a staggered fashion (1/3 each year).
Parameters: α = 5, β = 0.95, collateralized share of income is 10%. The results are generated by simulating an economy with 3,000
agents and 10,000 periods.
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Figure 7: Conditional Expected Excess return and Volatility with IRB Traders: Benchmark Econ-
omy.
The full line in the top panel is the conditional expected excess return (on the left hand side axis). The full line in the bottom panel
is the conditional standard deviation (on the left hand axis). The dashed line is a 4-period moving average of aggregate consumption
growth with linearly decreasing weights. This calibration has 50% non-participants, 5% Mertonian and 45% irb traders. The target
equity share is 41%. The irb traders re-balance every three periods in a staggered fashion (1/3 each year). Parameters: α = 5, β = 0.95,
collateralized share of income is 10%. The results are generated by simulating an economy with 3,000 agents and 10,000 periods.
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51Figure 8: Conditional Sharpe Ratio: Benchmark Economy with irb Non-Mertonian Traders.
Scatter plot of the 100 data points in ﬁgure 6. On the x-axis is a 4-period moving average of aggregate consumption growth with linearly
decreasing weights. On the y-axis is the conditional expected excess return on equity. This calibration has 50% non-participants, 5%
complete and 45% irb traders. The target equity share is 41%. The irb traders re-balance every three periods in a staggered fashion (1/3
each year). Parameters: α = 5, β = 0.95, collateralized share of income is 10%. The results are generated by simulating an economy
with 3,000 agents.







































Figure 9: Conditional Sharpe Ratio: Benchmark Economy with crb Non-Mertonian Traders.
Scatter plot of the 100 data points in ﬁgure 6. On the x-axis is a 4-period moving average of aggregate consumption growth with linearly
decreasing weights. On the y-axis is the conditional expected excess return on equity. This calibration has 50% non-participants, 5%
complete and 45 % crb traders. The target equity share is 41%. The irb traders re-balance every three periods in a staggered fashion
(1/3 each year). Parameters: α = 5, β = 0.95, collateralized share of income is 10%. The results are generated by simulating an economy
with 3,000 agents.







































52Figure 10: Log Dividend Yield: Benchmark Economy
The investment strategy is to buy-and-hold a ﬁxed number of shares and to receive dividends with growth rate ∆logDiv−E(∆logDiv) =
λ[∆logC − E(∆logC)]. In the top (bottom) panel, the leverage parameter λ is 3 (4). On the y-axis is the demeaned log of the dividend
yield. This calibration has 50% non-participants, 5% complete and 45% crb traders. The target equity share is 41%. The irb traders
re-balance every three periods in a staggered fashion (1/3 each year). Parameters: α = 5, β = 0.95, collateralized share of income is
10%. The results are generated by simulating an economy with 3,000 agents.






















Figure 11: Low-Frequency Variation in U.S. Stock Market Volatility.
8-year Moving Average of Annualized Standard Deviation of Daily Stock Return Volatility. We compute the following measure of annual
stock market volatility: V olt =
Pt
i=t−249 (ri − r)
2 ÷ 250. The ﬁgure plots an 8-year moving average of V olt. Daily Stock Return data
from CRSP value-weighted index for AMEX-NASDAQ-NYSE (1925-2010).





















































8−year moving average of Annualized Stock Return Volatility
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